Over many centuries, the homing pigeon has been selectively bred for returning home from a distant location. As a result of this strong selective pressure, homing pigeons have developed an excellent spatial navigation system. This system passes through the hippocampal formation, which shares many striking similarities to the mammalian hippocampus; there are a host of shared neuropeptides, interconnections, and its role in the storage and manipulation of spatial maps. There are some notable differences as well: there are unique connectivity patterns (...) and spatial encoding strategies. This review summarizes the comparisons between the avian and mammalian hippocampal systems, and the responses of single neurons in several general categories: location and place cells responding in specific areas, path and goal cells responding between goal locations, context-dependent cells that respond before or during a task, and pattern, grid, and boundary cells that increase firing at stable intervals. Head-direction cells, responding to a specific compass direction, are found in mammals and other birds but not to date in pigeons. By studying an animal that evolved under significant adaptive pressure to quickly develop a complex and efficient spatial memory system, we may better understand the comparative neurology of neurospatial systems, and plot new and potentially fruitful avenues of comparative research in the future. (shrink)

Nurses are often caught in the middle of what appear to be intractable moral conflicts. For such times, the function and limits of moral compromise need to be explored. Compromise is compatible with moral integrity if a number of conditions are met. Among these are the sharing of a moral language, mutual respect on the part of those who differ, acknowledgement of factual and moral complexities, and recognition of limits to compromise. Nurses are in a position uniquely suited to leadership (...) in fostering an environment that makes compromise with integrity possible. Keywords: compromise, integrity, nursing ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Abstract:When people reason on the basis of moral rules, do they suppose that in the absence of a prohibitory rule they are free to act, or do they suppose that morality always requires a justification establishing a permission to act? In this essay we present a series of learning experiments that indicate when learners tend to close their system on the basis of natural liberty and when on the principle of residual prohibition. Those who are taught prohibitory rules tend to (...) infer natural liberty while those taught permission rules tend to infer residual prohibition. In mixed cases, where learners are taught both types of rules, there is some tendency to suppose that natural liberty is the default. Both natural liberty and its denial can be learned; is there a reason to adopt one system of moral rules or the other? We argue that systems of social morality based on a principle of natural liberty have a striking advantage over their competitors: they are well adapted to effectively exploring the constant novel circumstances that arise in open, dynamic, societies. (shrink)

Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...) such states looks rather contextualist. It might also be called quasi-foundationalist. However, in attending to our epistemological tasks we must rely on processing that is sensitive to information that we could not articulate, that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When focusing on the full range of epistemologically important processes, the structure of what makes for justification is rather more like that envisioned by some coherentists. (shrink)

Corporations have not sufficiently yielded to social pressures for humanitarian reforms. To make such reforms requires that management give up some control. Giving up control contradicts traditional managerial philosophy. The bureaucratic structure of corporations gives management the power to virtually eliminate most social influences. An alternative to the bureaucratic corporation is a shared ownership corporation where investors, management, and low ranking employees all own the corporation. This alternative balances the power by giving all participants in the corporation power to influence (...) policy. Without this redistribution of power, or something like it, any hope for significant humanitarian reforms is vain. (shrink)

In this essay I sketch a philosophical argument for classical liberalism based on the requirements of public reason. I argue that we can develop a philosophical liberalism that, unlike so much recent philosophy, takes existing social facts and mores seriously while, at the same time, retaining the critical edge characteristic of the liberal tradition. I argue that once we develop such an account, we are led toward a vindication of “old” (qua classical) liberal morality—what Benjamin Constant called the “liberties of (...) the moderns.” A core thesis of the paper is that a regime of individual rights is crucial to the project of public justification because it disperses moral authority to individuals thus mitigating what I call the “burdens of justification.” Footnotesa Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Philosophy Department workshop on the morality of capitalism, and at the conference on rights theory at the Murphy Institute, Tulane University. I am grateful for the comments of the participants; my special thanks to David Schmidtz, Julian Lamont, and Andrea Houchard for their useful written comments and suggestions. (shrink)

:Some understand utopia as an ideal society in which everyone would be thoroughly informed by a moral ethos: all would always act on their pure conscientious judgments about justice, and so it would never be necessary to provide incentives for them to act as justice requires. In this essay I argue that such a society is impossible. A society of purely conscientiously just agents would be unable to achieve real justice. This is the Paradox of Pure Conscientiousness. This paradox, I (...) argue, can only be overcome when individuals are prepared to depart from their own pure, conscientious, judgments of justice. (shrink)

That the Bible rejoices in humour might come as a surprise to many. Yet since humour can be the most powerful method of communicating serious information in an appealing, relaxing and respectful manner, we must surely expect to find humour in the Scriptures. In fact, as this article explains, it is there in abundance. It is at the heart of our salvation history. The Bible 'revels in a profound laughter, a divine and human laughter that is endemic to the whole (...) narrative of creation, fall and salvation, and finally a laughter that results in a wondrous, all-encompassing comic vision'. We surely find divine humour in our attempts as humans to judge the actions of God according to our expectations and then to discover that our conclusions are dramatically wrong. (shrink)

Exceptuada la primera mitad de la Athēnaiōn Politeia, cuya autoría sigue siendo discutida, no hay obras de investigación histórica en el corpus aristotélico. Esto fortalece la impresión de que la teoría política aristotélica se abstrae de la historia. Esta opinión es reforzada por las afirmaciones contenidas en la Poética, que atenúan la importancia de la historia y los historiadores en favor de la poesía y los poetas. Esta contribución ofrece una interpretación más matizada, que se apoya sobre todo en una (...) lectura intertextual de la Athēnaiōn Politeia y el libro 5 de la Política. Ambos textos dirigen la atención del lector hacia la historia, pero en una manera completamente diferente. En este artículo argumento que los usos que hace Aristóteles de la historia son fundamentales para sus intercambios dialógicos con las narraciones que los seres humanos construyen para dar sentido a sus experiencias y aclarar sus opciones a la hora de elegir. Si se leen en este espíritu dialógico, estos textos resaltan las posibilidades y los riesgos de la acción política y salvaguardan la importancia tanto de la historia como de la poesía para la teoría política aristotélica. Palabras-clave: historia, poesía, ciencias sociales, teoría política. (shrink)

The notion of a weakly scattered theory T is defined. T need not be scattered. For each a model of T, let sr() be the Scott rank of . Assume sr() ≤ ω\sp A \sb 1 for all a model of T. Let σ\sp T \sb 2 be the least Σ₂ admissible ordinal relative to T. If T admits effective k-splitting as defined in this paper, then θσ\cal Aθ\cal A$ a model of T.

Simon Rippon believes that a certain argument is not sound.1 I agree. I do not agree with the role he assigns the argument in the debate about organ sales. Nor do I agree with the much stronger argument he puts forward that organ sales should be forbidden.The argument he believes unsound, which I shall use his terminology to refer to as the Laissez-Choisir or LC argument, has three premises. The one be believes false says, “If we take away what some (...) regard as their best option, we thereby make them worse off, at least from their own perspective”.Applied to the case of a market for organs, this says that if we take away what the potential organ seller regards as his best option, that is, there being a market for his organs, we make him worse off as judged by him. The reason Rippon thinks this argument is false is that, as I have argued and have been cited by Rippon, adding an option can, in addition to merely adding a choice, have adverse effects on the agents, can harm the agent by his own lights. Thus, says Rippon, if the argument is unsound, then it does not follow that if we deny the agent the option to sell his organs, we must be acting paternalistically. The option we are taking away is one that the agent himself regards as harmful.This is correct as far as it goes, but it might leave the reader thinking that the premise is never true. This would be to overlook the fact that even if the additional option …. (shrink)

Consider a stylized contrast between medical and business ethics. Both fields of applied ethics focus on a profession whose activities are basic to human welfare. Both enquire into obligations of professionals, and the relations between goals intrinsic to the profession and ethical duties to others and to the society. I am struck, however, by a fundamental difference: whereas medical ethics takes place against a background of almost universal consensus that the practice of medicine is admirable and morally praiseworthy, the business (...) profession is embedded within the framework of firms in a capitalist market economy, and for the last century and a half there has been sustained debate about the moral and economic justifiability of such an economy. To be sure, even under socialism there might be an “ethics of socialist managers,” and there would be some overlap between such an ethic and contemporary business ethics. Nevertheless, many of the characteristic problems of business ethics — e.g., what are the obligations of a corporation to its shareholders? — arise only in the context of a private property-based market economy. This raises a deep problem for business ethics: can one develop an account of ethical practices for an activity (i.e., business) while ignoring that the context in which this activity occurs (i.e., capitalism) is morally controversial? It is as if the work in medical ethics proceeded in the midst of widespread disagreement whether medicine was a good thing. Another way of thinking about the problem is: if one teaches business ethics, does this commit you to accepting that business can be ethical? And doesn’t this commit you to accepting that capitalism is justifiable?1 I suspect that this is a serious problem for many teachers of business ethics. Many were trained in academic philosophy, and within academic philosophy there are many who think — or at least suspect — that capitalism is basically unjust, or perhaps that only a greatly modified capitalism would be acceptable.. (shrink)

In this essay, seek to provide a plausible alternative to Maclntyre’s bold and provocative conception of modernity. I contest his claim that modern social life is marked by (1) the absence of any shared paradigm of the good, tradition, and social morality; (2) rationally interminable normative conflict; (3) characteristically instrumental poweroriented social relations; and (4) the impossibility of genuine human achievement and virtue. I argue that modern conflict is rooted not in the absence of a shored paradigm of the good (...) or the moral; but rather in a structure of social irrationality built into the modern conception of the good or the achievement of individual recognition in and through socioeconomic activity. I argue that while this conception has affirmative dimensions and does permit genuine virtue, the way it is culturally interpreted and institutionally embodied in modern capitalist society reproduces destructive scarcities in human recognition and the degradation of ordinary persons’ capacity for virtue. Where Moclntyre argues for a restoration of the pre-modern (Aristotelian) conception of the moral to be realized in spheres of activity external to socio-economic life, I argue for on immanent critique of modern liberal individualism which would humanize the meaning, conditions, and results of lobar and livelihood. (shrink)

Randy E. Burnett, The Structure of Liberty Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, xi + 347pp.

Targeted killing is a subspecies of assassination, deployed against irregular combatants such as terrorists. The justification for targeted killing bypasses the usual ‘war paradigm’ and ‘criminal enforcement paradigm’, and is thus unusual. There are various ways of securing such a justification, but also a number of dangers attending these arguments.